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at www.dallasfed.org.Letter from the President
While growth in the 
advanced economies has 
yet to fully eliminate the 
output gap that emerged 
during the financial crisis, 
progress in the emerging 
market economies has been 
better, and the concerns 
of policymakers in those 
economies have shifted 
from sustaining growth to 
reining in incipient inflation 
pressures.
As we enter the second decade of the new 
century, the global economy finds itself on a firmer 
footing, despite political unrest in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa and the disasters in Japan. 
While growth in the advanced economies has yet 
to fully eliminate the output gap that emerged 
during the financial crisis, progress in the emerg-
ing market economies has been better, and the 
concerns of policymakers in those economies have 
shifted from sustaining growth to reining in incipi-
ent inflation pressures.
This year’s Globalization and Monetary Policy 
Institute annual report contains three articles 
on different aspects of globalization. The first, by 
Enrique Martínez-García and Janet Koech, is a 
summary of a conference the institute hosted at the 
Dallas Fed in March to (somewhat belatedly) mark 
the 10th anniversary of the creation of the euro. The 
essay goes beyond a simple summary of what was 
discussed at the conference to put the creation of 
the euro in a broader historical and economic per-
spective. The euro's creation in 1999 was an event 
of enormous significance, but not one without risks. 
The European Central Bank has so far successfully 
fulfilled its mandate for price stability, but the ten-
sions in euro sovereign debt markets that emerged 
in 2010, precipitated by developments in Greece 
and Ireland, seem to have vindicated the concerns 
of some prior to the launch of the project.
The second essay, by Janet Koech, looks at 
why, of all the major regions in the world, Africa 
seems to have benefited the least from globaliza-
tion. The continent is rich in natural resources and 
has become an important destination for foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by emerging market 
economies—especially China—seeking to secure 
access to raw materials vital to their long-term 
growth. Before the global downturn, the continent’s 
FDI inflows surged to a record high, although the 
numbers still compare unfavorably to those in 
other developing regions. Africa’s prospects for 
sustained growth and development depend on 
continuing efforts to draw more such investment, 
including achieving political stability.
The final essay, by Payton Odom, looks at 
how well we measure the cost of shipping goods 
internationally. Despite dramatic changes in the 
tradability of many services, the bulk of interna-
tional trade is still trade in goods. Changes in trade 
flows—and in the cost of shipping goods—are a 
potentially useful source of information about the 
state of the global economy. 
These essays give but a flavor of the wide array 
of research projects that are under way at the insti-
tute. For a more comprehensive view of the work 
going on at the institute, please take a look at the list 
of working papers that have been produced by staff 
and associated researchers over the past year.
Richard W. Fisher
President and CEO
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Since we began our research program on glo-
balization and monetary policy, we have believed 
that a reputation for excellence in this area will 
be built on a foundation of solid, peer-reviewed 
academic research. To that end, during 2010 the 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute staff 
and research associates circulated 27 new working 
papers (of which seven were contributed by the 
institute’s core permanent staff), bringing to 67 the 
total number of working papers issued since the in-
stitute was created in 2007. Through mid-December, 
the 67 items that had appeared in the working paper 
series had received a total of 5,550 abstract views and 
2,903 file downloads.
Academic Research
Of course, working papers are just an intermedi-
ate product: The real measure of success is the extent 
to which these papers appear in quality journals and, 
in particular, the extent to which the permanent staff 
is successful in publishing in top journals. 
Anthony Landry’s paper on “The Quantitative 
Role of Capital-Goods Imports” (coauthored with 
Michele Cavallo and circulated as institute Working 
Paper no. 47 in 2010) was published in the Ameri-
can Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 
issue in May, and his paper on “State-Dependent 
Pricing, Local-Currency Pricing and Exchange Rate 
Pass-Through” (which previously appeared as insti-
tute Working Paper no. 39 in 2009) was published in 
the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control in 
October. Jian Wang’s paper “International Trade in 
Durable Goods: Understanding Volatility, Cyclicali-
ty, and Elasticities” (coauthored with institute senior 
fellow Charles Engel and previously circulated as 
institute Working Paper no. 3 in 2007) was accepted 
for publication and appeared in the Journal of In-
ternational Economics. Enrique Martínez-García’s 
paper “A Model of the Exchange Rate with Infor-
mational Frictions,” (which previously circulated as 
institute Working Paper no. 2) was published in the 
B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics in January 2010. 
A variety of other papers by institute staff are at 
various stages of the review process at journals such 
as the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of 
International Economics, the Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking and Macroeconomic Dynamics.
Conferences
Institute staff members continue to be active 
organizing sessions and presenting at the leading 
professional conferences. Anthony Landry orga-
nized and chaired a session on “Open Economy 
Economic Growth” at the January meetings of 
the American Economic Association in Atlanta. 
The papers from this session, including Landry’s 
paper, were published in the American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings in May. Staff gave 
a number of seminars at universities during the year 
and were active in the major conferences, including 
the World Congress of the Econometric Society, 
the Society for Economic Dynamics, the Canadian 
Economics Association annual meeting, the 16th 
International Conference on Computing in Eco-
nomics and Finance, and the Western Economic 
Association annual meeting, among others.
In March the institute organized and hosted a 
conference with the Peterson Institute for Inter-
national Economics in Washington, D.C., and 
the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel to mark 
the 10th anniversary of the euro. The conference 
included presentations by speakers from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, European Central Bank, 
European Commission, Bank of England and 
Bank of Portugal and was very well attended. (See 
related article on page 4.) The day after the euro 
conference, the institute hosted a one-day meeting 
of the Economics Interest Section of the European 
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Union Studies Association. We also organized a 
conference on “Microeconomic Sources of Real 
Exchange Rate Behavior” with the Center for Inter-
national Price Research at Vanderbilt University 
on Sept. 24–25. (See the conference program on 
page 38.)
Bank Publications
Institute staff contributed a number of articles 
to Bank publications during the year. Two articles 
appeared in the Bank’s Economic Letter during the 
first quarter: “A Historical Look at the Labor Market 
During Recessions” by Enrique Martínez-García 
and Janet Koech in January, and “Durable Goods 
and the Collapse of Global Trade” by Jian Wang 
in February. Ananth Ramanarayanan’s Economic 
Letter on “Sovereign Debt: A Matter of Willingness, 
Not Ability, to Pay” appeared in September, as did 
Enrique Martínez-García and Mark Wynne’s Staff 
Paper on “The Global Slack Hypothesis” (which was 
based on their presentation to the Federal Open 
Market Committee in 2009). Simona Cociuba’s 
Economic Letter on “Financial Crisis Revives Inter-
est in Special Drawing Rights” appeared in October. 
Anthony Landry’s Economic Letter on “The Global-
ization of Ideas” appeared in November.
Visitors to the institute also contributed to 
Bank publications: Andrew Cassey’s Staff Paper on 
“Analyzing the Export Flow from Texas to Mexico” 
appeared in October. Shalah Mostashari’s Economic 
Letters on “When Tariff Cuts Don’t Boost Import 
Variety” and “Expanding Variety of Goods Under-
scores Battle for Competitive Advantage” both 
appeared in December. 
Visitors and Research Associates
We continue to add to our roster of research 
associates. Joining our network in 2010 were 
Pierpaolo Benigno (LUISS), Martin Berka (Massey 
University), Ester Faia (Goethe University), Rasmus 
Fatum (University of Alberta), Christoph Fischer 
(Deutsche Bundesbank), Ippei Fujiwara (Bank of 
Japan), Kathryn Russ (University of California–Da-
vis), Raphael Schoenle (Brandeis University), Etsuro 
Shioji (Hitotsubashi University), Ina Simonovska 
(University of California–Davis) and Kozo Ueda 
(Bank of Japan).
Andrew Cassey from Washington State Uni-
versity began a month-long visit in June to work on 
the determinants of Texas–Mexico trade. Erasmus 
Kersting of Villanova University visited several 
days a week in June to work on a project on credit 
market imperfections and endogenous growth with 
Enrique Martínez-García. Greg Johnson, a PhD 
student at SMU, worked for the institute as a sum-
mer intern, examining the relationship between 
financial globalization, risk sharing and contagion. 
Joaquín López, a PhD student at the University of 
Chicago, also worked as a summer intern at the 
institute, looking at modeling real exchange rate dy-
namics. Russell Cooper, a professor at the European 
University Institute in Florence, Italy, visited for a 
week in June and began a project with Mark Wynne 
on monetary unions, fiscal rules and bailouts that 
will seek to develop a more formal understanding 
of the factors leading to the recent (and not yet fully 
resolved) crisis in Greece and the European Mon-
etary Union. In the fall, two institute staff members 
(Simona Cociuba and Ananth Ramanarayanan) 
went on leave as visiting associate professors to the 
University of Western Ontario in Canada. Shalah 
Mostashari, a recent PhD from the University of 
Texas at Austin, visited the institute for the fall 2010 
semester and worked on issues related to interna-
tional trade. Mostashari also contributed a paper to 
the institute’s working paper series.
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The euro has survived its first decade, over-
coming questions about its viability and political 
and economic raison d'être. “The Euro and the 
Dollar in the Crisis and Beyond,” a conference 
sponsored by Bruegel, the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics and the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, marked the milestone on March 
17, 2010, with discussions of Europe’s monetary 
integration, the euro’s global role relative to the dol-
lar and the currency’s prospects in the aftermath of 
the 2008–09 global recession.
Adam Posen, senior fellow at the Peterson 
Institute and member of the Monetary Policy 
Committee of the Bank of England, set the tone 
in opening remarks, referring to “what is a very 
critical economic relationship and some very 
interesting economic issues” involving the single 
currency. Vítor Gaspar, a special adviser of the 
Banco de Portugal and former director general 
of research at the European Central Bank (ECB), 
lauded the euro’s “extremely successful [run] in its 
first decade” and its “continued success,” citing the 
currency’s expansion into eastern Europe and the 
ECB’s emergence as a credible guardian of price 
stability.
Still, conference participants were cautious, 
noting that common monetary policy alone 
may be insufficient for macro stabilization. The 
global downturn and subsequent sovereign debt 
crisis constitute a major test of whether the euro’s 
benefits justify its costs. Lessons learned from the 
experience may affect economic and monetary 
integration in Europe and elsewhere. In this essay 
we revisit the conference insights regarding the 
euro in light of its long history and its complex 
economic underpinnings.
Genesis of the European Single  
Currency
In the years after World War II, stable ex-
change rates and removal of trade and payment 
restrictions supported the economic recovery and 
reconstruction. The United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, N.H., in 
1944 laid the groundwork for a new international 
monetary order. It concluded with an agreement 
to peg participating nations’ currencies to gold, 
within narrow bands of fluctuation of plus/minus 
1 percent, while allowing some leeway to adjust 
parities.1
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was 
to provide temporary funding to sustain the peg, 
while capital account restrictions were accepted 
under Bretton Woods for countries with pegged 
currencies so they could maintain some control 
over domestic monetary policy. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 
brought a new impetus for trade liberalization and 
multilateral trade negotiations.
The Euro and the Dollar in the Crisis and Beyond
Adam Posen from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Vítor Gaspar from Banco de   
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The Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948—
predecessor to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), created 
in 1961—in part to channel Marshall Plan funds 
(the U.S. European Recovery Program) to western 
Europe. The OEEC under its Secretary-General 
Robert Marjolin also promoted trade and estab-
lishment in 1950 of the European Payments Union 
(EPU) as a clearinghouse for the multilateral 
settlement of payments. The EPU was replaced 
in 1958 with the European Monetary Agreement 
(EMA) amid stricter requirements for net deficit 
settlement. Greater current account and currency 
convertibility followed, leading to the heyday of 
Bretton Woods.
European integration took a step forward 
with the Treaty of Paris establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, under 
which France and West Germany pooled their coal 
and steel resources with Belgium, Italy, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands. The same countries 
signed the Treaties of Rome in 1957 establishing 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). 
The EEC sought to advance toward a unified 
market for goods, services, workers and capital—
the Common Market—through a customs union 
to promote trade in industrial goods and through 
a common agricultural policy conferring special 
protected status to agriculture.2
The seminal works of Robert A. Mundell 
(1961), Ronald I. McKinnon (1963) and Peter B. 
Kenen (1969) on optimal currency areas helped 
develop an economic rationale for the euro. 
However, Marjolin, European Commission vice 
president at the time, was the first EEC official to 
publicly recognize in 1962 that the Common Mar-
ket might require more than the Treaty of Rome’s 
customs union or the Bretton Woods’ fixed (but 
adjustable) peg. In a memorandum, he urged a 
common monetary policy and single currency for 
EEC member states.
“… the emergence of a European reserve 
currency would considerably facilitate inter-
national monetary co-operation and a reform 
of the present system. …The Treaty [of Rome] 
makes provision for a common commercial 
policy but not for a common monetary policy; 
this is an obvious gap which needs to be 
bridged.”3
The process of European monetary union, 
however, did not formally begin until 1990—al-
most 30 years after Marjolin advocated a common 
monetary policy.
The Cost of a Common Monetary 
Standard
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“a domain within which exchange rates are fixed,” 
not necessarily coinciding with existing political 
borders. Conference participants echoed this idea, 
but noted the complexities of assessing the costs 
and benefits of giving up the exchange rate to form 
a currency area. In Mundell’s (1961) judgment, a 
country’s costs of joining depend on how well it 
manages its economy absent the exchange rate 
and how the burden of adjustment is shared by 
all countries maintaining fixed rates (see Box 1). 
He argued that the costs of fixing the exchange 
rate must be small if internal factor mobility—the 
movement of production inputs, especially labor—
is high relative to mobility outside the area. In that 
case, a fixed exchange rate arrangement is likely 
to be optimal even if the benefits are otherwise 
modest.
Progress on structural reform involving 
European economic integration has been slow, 
especially because of insufficient factor mobility 
and institutional impediments such as varying 
degrees of centralized wage bargaining among 
countries. Ajai Chopra, deputy director of the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) European 
department, told the conference: “One could argue 
that differences in structural flexibility and [the] 
different pace of reform … in different parts of the 
euro area have also contributed to imbalances 
[that is, uneven economic performance] given the 
common monetary policy.”
Under Bretton Woods, western Europe had 
moved toward establishing a common monetary 
standard, defined as a credible and irrevocably 
fixed exchange rate regime where national cur-
rencies remain in circulation. Preserving such a 
common standard was difficult because of slow 
progress implementing necessary structural 
reforms to reduce the costs of fixing the exchange 
rate. In turn, adhering to a common monetary 
policy and sharing the burden of adjustment 
rested on a framework of greater policy coordina-
tion. Without verification and clear accountability, 
such voluntary commitments could not survive—
Box 1
Asymmetric Demand Shifts and the Costs of a Fixed Exchange 
Rate Regime
  Robert A. Mundell (1961) assumed that nominal wages and prices “cannot be 
reduced in the short run without causing unemployment” and studied the effect of 
an asymmetric demand shift from, say, Italian to German goods. The shift causes a 
current account surplus, employment growth and cost pressures in Germany, while 
lowering employment and inflation in Italy. In a floating exchange rate regime, the 
appreciation of the deutsche mark in response to the demand shift turns “the terms 
of trade against” Germany and the resulting increase in demand for Italian goods 
reduces Italy’s deficit without worsening its employment or creating inflation in 
Germany.
  Under a fixed (nominal) exchange rate regime, the real exchange can still allow 
needed external adjustments if Germany is willing to let its domestic prices rise or 
Italy is willing to make its prices fall. In the first scenario, German goods become 
more expensive than Italian ones as German prices increase, so consumers substitute 
away and shift the demand back toward Italian-made goods. In the second scenario, 
if Germany chooses to use its domestic monetary policy to keep German inflation 
subdued and maintain price stability, Italy can only eliminate its current account 
deficit with domestic policies that reduce prices and employment. In the former case, 
Germany suffers the external adjustment costs with higher inflation, while in the lat-
ter instance, Italy bears those costs with depressed levels of employment.
  If domestic monetary policy is curtailed either by freer capital movements under a 
common monetary standard or by forming a full monetary union, then “to relieve the 
unemployment in [Italy] the central banks in both countries would have to expand the 
national money supplies, or to prevent inflation in [Germany], contract the national 
money supplies…[but] both unemployment and inflation cannot be escaped.” The 
reallocation of labor from Italy to Germany can accomplish the desired external 
rebalancing maintaining the fixed rate by reducing unemployment in Italy (through 
migration) and raising the demand for German goods from within—while damping the 
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as EEC experience during the 1960s and 1970s un-
derscores. The “economic performance [of Europe] 
and its resilience … depend very much not only on 
the quality of the policies but also on the quality of 
the policy frameworks,” Chopra concluded.
Achieving Marjolin’s vision for a single cur-
rency and monetary union required more than a 
common monetary standard. It called for a single 
currency to replace the national currencies and a 
common monetary policy. That entailed surren-
dering domestic monetary policy and limiting 
economic divergence among EEC member states. 
Mundell (1961) argued that a common monetary 
standard and a monetary union “can be brought 
closer together by an institutional change … [to 
share] the burden of international adjustment.” 
However, the limitations of policy coordination 
were apparent every time that national interests 
diverged. By contrast, the option of monetary 
union provided a more credible framework based 
on a binding commitment among all member 
states.
The Credibility of a Common  
Monetary Standard
The currency of a country credibly com-
mitted to low and stable inflation offers a reli-
able store of value and, therefore, can become a 
preferred means of exchange and anchor for a 
fixed exchange rate area. The anchor currency 
predominates, while the other countries are forced 
to import the monetary policy of the “dominant” 
country (especially as capital mobility increases) 
or abandon the peg.4 A common monetary stan-
dard may collapse from loss of confidence in the 
monetary policy of the dominant country or loss of 
confidence in the willingness of the other mem-
bers to import the dominant country’s policies.
The demise of Bretton Woods—accelerated 
after the dissolution of the London Gold Pool 
in 1968—culminated when the dollar became 
inconvertible, closing the gold window in 1971, 
and freely floating in 1973.5 The monetary policy 
of the U.S., the dominant country under Bretton 
Woods, was constrained by its long-standing com-
mitment to gold convertibility and, by extension, 
to monetary growth and price stability. Bretton 
Woods unraveled in part because the U.S. progres-
sively abandoned its commitment to price stability 
during the 1960s—replacing a monetary rule with 
discretion (and looser monetary policy) for every-
body. The concern in European policy circles was 
that this new era of fiat monies and floating rates 
would hamper the overarching goal of establish-
ing the Common Market. European officials didn’t 
seek a return to gold convertibility or the dollar-
anchor, but aimed to reengineer an intra-EEC 
common monetary standard during the 1970s.
In 1970, a panel of experts chaired by Luxem-
bourg Prime Minister Pierre Werner—building on 
a 1969 proposal by European Commission Vice 
President Raymond Barre—advocated the adop-
tion of a single currency and a common monetary 
policy in part to prevent the emergence of a domi-
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nant country’s unconstrained monetary policy. 
The EEC agreed in 1972 to closer policy coordina-
tion and narrowing the margins of participating 
currencies to plus/minus 2.25 percent, a system 
known as the “European snake.” A European unit 
of account was established, but the Bundesbank’s 
reputation for price stability lifted the deutsche 
mark to become the de facto anchor currency.
The snake didn’t last, as countries opted for 
greater domestic autonomy when confronted with 
a decade of high inflation and low growth, even 
as European Commission President Roy Jenkins 
renewed the call for monetary union in 1977. The 
European Monetary System (EMS) was launched 
in 1979 around a grid of adjustable central parities 
with fixed margins—the exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM). It introduced the European currency unit 
(ECU) as a fixed-weight basket of member states’ 
currencies and set the ERM margins at plus/minus 
2.25 percent of the ECU (plus/minus 6 percent for 
some countries). The low-inflation deutsche mark 
again asserted itself as de facto anchor. More stable 
exchange rates and tamed inflation within the EEC 
were not attained until the 1980s.
The credibility of a fixed-rate regime depends 
not only on the price stability commitment of the 
dominant country, but also on that commitment 
being shared by all participating currencies. Carlos 
Zarazaga, senior economist and policy advisor at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, drew on the 
dollarization experience in Latin America to argue 
that credibility is fundamental when evaluating the 
advantages of a currency area and when compar-
ing a monetary union with a common monetary 
standard.
One potential advantage of joining a currency 
area is to constrain inflationary policies among 
countries accustomed to financing themselves 
through money creation, a past practice of some 
Latin American countries. Merely fixing the 
exchange rate does not solve the high-inflation 
problem because a fixed-rate rule is no more 
credible than a commitment to price stability. The 
temptation to temporarily boost economic activity 
by deviating from the monetary policy of the low-
inflation country often proves too strong to resist 
when policymakers are tolerant of inflation and 
the possibility of devaluating cannot be excluded. 
Such an option is incorporated into expectations, 
helping produce persistent inflation differentials, 
diverging monetary policies and recurring bouts of 
exchange rate instability.
Surrendering domestic monetary policies and 
forming a monetary union—even unilaterally, by 
adopting the dollar as legal tender through dollar-
ization—is one way to credibly commit to a fixed 
exchange rate rule. “It has become clear [now] that 
the adoption of the currency of the low-inflation 
country doesn’t import the institutions behind that 
currency’s reputation,” Zarazaga told the audience. 
Although the goals of dollarization partly material-
ized in Latin America through reduced inflation 
and improved monetary discipline, the framework 
achieved a mixed record as a means of raising 
living standards and promoting trade, competitive-
Enrique Martínez-García from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and   
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ness and growth, he said.
Latin American countries that dollarized were 
ready to accept the U.S. monetary policy uncondi-
tionally. The EEC, on the other hand, favored the 
creation of supranational institutions representa-
tive of the interests of all its member states. Es-
tablishment of the ECB has been a major accom-
plishment, Gaspar said. It required convincing the 
low-inflation country (Germany) to cede control 
over its domestic monetary policy. In return, the 
joint central bank pledged to adhere to the mon-
etary policy preferred by the low-inflation country 
and adopted a hard line on inflation to build its 
reputation. The ECB, indeed, was endowed with 
independence and given a single mandate, price 
stability. By comparison, the Federal Reserve’s dual 
mandate seeks “maximum employment” and price 
stability.
The  Trade-Offs of Financial  
Liberalization
The costs of a monetary union extend beyond 
those of fixing the exchange rate considered by 
Mundell (1961), because countries surrender 
control over their domestic monetary policy. The 
“impossibility trinity” principle, based on the work 
of J. Marcus Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963), 
states that a country cannot simultaneously 
maintain a fixed or highly managed exchange rate, 
an independent domestic monetary policy and 
free movement of capital. A country must choose 
two of the three and give up the other. As capital 
mobility increases, countries joining a com-
mon monetary standard lose more control over 
domestic monetary policy while adhering to the 
fixed exchange rates. Full monetary union entails 
surrendering domestic monetary policy no matter 
the degree of capital mobility. The difference in the 
costs of forming a full monetary union or preserv-
ing the common monetary standard narrows as 
nations remove capital account restrictions to 
facilitate freer capital movements.
Mundell (1973), in turn, argued that the 
gains of a currency area would be larger if the 
participating countries can better “insure” one 
another against asymmetric shocks. This provided 
a rationale for capital account liberalization and 
strengthened the case for intra-EEC financial inte-
gration. The Common Market involved a provision 
for free movement of capital, but, in effect, capital 
account controls became the norm during the 
1970s following the collapse of Bretton Woods and 
the first oil shock in 1973. European countries tried 
restricting capital account movements to main-
tain some degree of monetary policy autonomy 
while attempting to restore an intra-EEC common 
monetary standard. By the time the EMS became 
operational in 1979, the second oil shock hit, and it 
was almost assumed that capital controls, and fre-
quent parity realignments, would be unavoidable.
Having tamed the high inflation that plagued 
much of the world by the mid-1980s, the EEC 
vigorously renewed efforts toward capital account 
liberalization. The Single European Act in 1986 
became a major step toward freer movements of 
capital, people and services. “One couldn’t speak 
of freedom of capital movements” within the EEC 
until then, said Nicolas Véron, senior resident fel-
low at Bruegel, while noting that harmonization of 
institutions and regulations may have lagged. He 
cited slow development of European accounting 
standards as an example of lingering impediments 
to capital flows. Garry Schinasi, visiting fellow 
at Bruegel, said that greater European financial 
integration wasn’t accompanied by a conclusive 
debate at the European Union (EU) level on supra-
national financial regulation and supervision, still 
largely the prerogative of national governments.
Conference participants raised a number of 
caveats concerning the role of financial integra-
tion and capital account liberalization, based on 
the euro’s experience. Zsolt Darvas, a research 
fellow from Bruegel, said financial spillovers can 
make countries more exposed to external shocks. 
Financial liberalization and trade expansion have 
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as nations there prepare for EU membership, 
he noted, allowing the region to catch up with 
western Europe. At the same time, eastern Europe 
was especially affected by the 2008–09 recession 
and shocks originating from the advanced coun-
tries. “Integration made these [eastern European] 
countries more vulnerable,” Darvas said. The EU 
has provided some assistance, and the region 
avoided the “worst problems from past crises, such 
as currency overshooting, bank runs and banking 
system collapse,” Darvas added.
Thomas Glaessner, a Citigroup managing di-
rector and global policy strategist, questioned how 
much international capital market diversification 
is possible following removal of capital controls 
and other restrictions. “If you really look carefully 
at how correlated all asset prices have been into 
the crisis and out of the crisis, [it] is really, really 
exceptional. [Many investors] really are rethinking 
whether [they] are getting the diversification [they] 
thought [they] were getting,” Glaessner said. In 
other words, impediments to intra-European risk-
sharing may persist in spite of capital account lib-
eralization. However, absent these impediments, 
international diversification still may not produce 
the benefits envisioned by Mundell (1973) when 
there is strong comovement across such a large 
class of assets.
Joseph Gagnon, senior fellow at the Peterson 
Institute, noted that the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy can be severely affected when 
banking and other financing channels become 
impaired, as they did globally beginning in 2007. 
It is not obvious whether liberalization makes the 
financial system more resilient, but he argued that 
the 2008-09 global recession showed monetary 
policy must be unconventional to be effective in 
response to a financial crisis.
The Foundations of Monetary Union
A committee chaired by European Commis-
sion President Jacques Delors recommended in 
1989 that economic and monetary union (EMU) 
be achieved in three “discrete, but evolution-
ary steps” (see Box 2). The Treaty of Rome was 
updated, with the Treaty on European Union (the 
“Maastricht Treaty”) signed in 1992.6 Adoption of 
the euro required that all national central banks be 
independent and was conditional upon fulfillment 
of convergence criteria (Chart 1). Denmark and 
the U.K. were granted special status that did not 
oblige them to adopt the euro.
The convergence criteria sought to ensure 
sustainable intra-EU fixed exchange rates and a 
commitment to price stability shared by all. The 
criteria were also meant to assure Germany, the 
low-inflation country, that it would lose little after 
replacing its own currency and surrendering 
its independent monetary policy. However, the 
criteria neither guaranteed that the currency area 
was optimal nor likely to become so. Following the 
German reunification in 1990, the fixed parities of 
the ERM became increasingly difficult to maintain 
for some countries. The devaluation of the Italian 
lira in 1992 set in motion a chain of events that 
forced some permanent departures (the U.K.) and 
a widening of the fluctuation margins of the ERM 
Box 2
Three Stages of Economic and Monetary Union
stage 1  July 1, 1990–dec. 31, 1993
•  Full liberalization of capital movements; financial integration
•  Increased monetary cooperation
stage 2  Jan. 1, 1994–dec. 31, 1998
•  Establishment of European Monetary Institute (EMI), forerunner of the European Central  
  Bank (ECB)
•  Nominal convergence criteria installed; national central banks’ independence required
•  Fiscal policy coordination arrangements formalized under the Stability and Growth Pact  
  (SGP)
stage 3  Jan. 1, 1999–Present
•  Exchange rates irrevocably fixed; single monetary policy
•  The ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) become operational
•  Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) established for future euro area candidates
•  Banknotes and coins introduced; the euro becomes sole legal tender in 2002Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2010 Annual Report • Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   11
to plus/minus15 percent in 1993. The resulting di-
lution of the requirement of exchange rate stability 
did not help dispel doubts on whether the euro’s 
costs truly outweighed its benefits.
The Maastricht Treaty’s budgetary con-
vergence criteria were added to constrain the 
least-disciplined countries (Chart 1D, E). One 
conventional view is that price stability need not 
require that fiscal policy be subordinate to mon-
etary policy. Michael Woodford (1996) argued that 
monetary policy cannot simultaneously accom-
modate fiscal policy and maintain price stability.7 
In a monetary union, not even adherence to sound 
fiscal practices can protect a country from price 
or output fluctuations generated by the worsening 
budget position of another country. What matters 
is the overall state of public finances of all coun-
tries. In principle, the fiscally responsible country 
could still insulate itself by varying its own budget 
surplus to compensate for the budget variations of 
the other country, keeping their combined public 
debt on a steady path. This amounts to financing 
the less financially disciplined country’s budget 
deficits, something few governments would be 
eager to do.
In the EMU’s institutional framework, fiscal 
policy is decentralized, remaining the responsibil-
ity of the national governments though formally 
limited by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
of 1996. After the exchange rate convergence 
criterion was loosened in 1993, the SGP aimed to 
strengthen the soundness of public finances by 
making permanent the Maastricht convergence 
criteria of a 3 percent deficit-to-GDP ratio and a 60 
percent debt-to-GDP ratio. It also established an 
enforcement mechanism, the excessive deficit pro-
cedure, which relies on surveillance and possible 
sanctions. The SGP was revised in 2005, becom-
ing more tolerant of deficits arising from cyclical 
downturns and allowing more country autonomy.
David Mayes, adjunct professor and director 
of the Europe Institute at the University of Auck-
land, noted that before the 2008–09 global reces-
sion, there was impressive progress in terms of 
deficit reduction. He argued that the current stress 
in most member states suggests that the consolida-
tion was cyclical rather than structural—especially 
for the peripheral euro area countries. In early 
2010, Greece struggled paying its sovereign debt, 
and by the end of the year, Ireland had difficulty 
meeting its obligations. Spain, Portugal and Italy 
also sustained diminished investor confidence and 
consequent higher borrowing costs as concern 
over their public finances mounted (Chart 2).
Absent a centralized, redistributive fiscal 
policy, the EU adopted an ad hoc strategy of 
providing emergency credit lines through the 
European Financial Stability Facility and the 
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism to 
curb the spread of financial woes to other member 
states. The IMF also provided emergency funds 
and technical assistance. A growing number of 
European countries are installing austerity mea-
sures aimed at returning to the bounds of the SGP, 
especially regarding the deficit. Conference partici-
pants suggested that the EMU’s unique framework 
Garry Schinasi from Bruegel and Edwin Truman from the Peterson Institute  
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Chart 1
Convergence Criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union
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The Maastricht convergence criteria are 
a. price stability (not more than 1.5 
percentage points above the unweighted 
arithmetic average of the three best-per-
forming member states, computed based 
on the latest available 12-month average 
of each country’s harmonized consumer 
price index over the previous 12-month 
average); B. exchange rate stabil-
ity (participation in the exchange rate 
mechanism, ERM, for two years without 
severe tensions); C. long-term interest 
rate convergence (not more than 2 
percentage points above the unweighted 
arithmetic average of the three best-per-
forming member states in terms of price 
stability based on the latest available 
12-month average for each); d. sound 
public finances (with reference value 
of no more than 3 percent for the general 
government overall deficit over GDP); 
and e. sustainable public finances 
(with reference value of no more than 60 
percent for the general government debt 
over GDP).
B. Exchange Rate Stability
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NOTES: Shaded areas represent stipulations set by the Maastricht convergence criteria. The 
charts plot the data for the 16 euro-area countries. Reference values for inflation and interest 
rates are based on data for all 27 European Union (EU) member states since each joined the 
EU. The exchange rate bands correspond to the wider margins of +/–15 percent adopted for the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) since August 1993 and to the prevailing margins of +/–2.25 
percent prior to that. Belgium and Luxembourg formed a monetary union in 1921 that survived 
until the adoption of the euro in 1999. Since 1944, one Luxembourgish franc was equal to one 
Belgian franc, so only the Belgian franc exchange rate is plotted. All exchange rates are quoted 
as national currencies per ECU (European currency unit). 
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of centralized monetary policy and decentralized 
fiscal policy was flawed because it didn’t allow 
interregional solidarity within the EU.
Kenen (1969) argued that a more centralized, 
redistributive fiscal policy can be used to compen-
sate for the costs and to sustain a currency area 
even when factors of production such as labor are 
not perfectly mobile. As Chopra noted, facilitating 
interregional transfers to respond to asymmetric 
shocks requires the EU to open the debate on par-
tially centralizing fiscal policy. However, European 
integration has traditionally followed the principle 
of subsidiarity that matters ought to be handled by 
the competent authority closest to the affected citi-
zens. It remains to be seen whether the sovereign 
debt crisis in Greece and Ireland will change how 
the principle of subsidiarity is applied to fiscal mat-
ters and result in any significant transfer of fiscal 
resources to the EU, conference participants said.
The Benefits of Monetary Union
In a 1990 report, “One Market, One Money,” 
the European Commission noted that intra-EEC 
trade is largely also intra-industry trade in which 
countries buy and sell the same types of goods—
Italy sells Fiat cars in Germany, and Germany 
Volkswagen cars in Italy. Trade integration means 
that most sector (supply-side) shocks affect all 
countries similarly and also reduces the likeli-
hood of asymmetric demand shifts about which 
Mundell (1961) worried (see Box 1). The adoption 
of a common currency would simply reinforce 
those tendencies, lowering the costs of maintain-
ing a currency area. Kenen (1969) also argued that 
countries with a more diversified productive struc-
ture were less subject to industry-specific demand 
shocks and, therefore, more likely to constitute an 
optimal currency area.
In turn, Paul Krugman (1991) argued that 
deeper trade integration, particularly in the pres-
ence of economies of scale and synergies, leads to 
regional concentration of industrial activities and 
specialization. Proximity to the final consumer is 
weighed against the economies of scale through 
production centralization to determine optimal 
location patterns. Trade integration may result 
in greater country specialization, increasing the 
exposure to asymmetric shocks and making it 
costlier to form a currency area and adopt a com-
mon currency. McKinnon (1963) and Alberto Ale-
sina and Robert J. Barro (2002) argued that small 
and highly open economies may achieve greater 
trade benefits by forming a currency area with 
their largest trading partners. The debate remains 
open as to how much heightened trade integra-
tion prior to monetary union may have facilitated 
the introduction of the euro and which countries 
benefited most.
The benefits of adopting a common monetary 
standard are also predicated partly on the notion 
that reducing exchange rate risk/uncertainty and 
increasing price transparency encourage competi-
tion, trade and investment. Intra-area exchange 
Chart 2
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bonds for various countries and German 10-year government bonds.
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rate risk/uncertainty can only be completely 
eliminated with full monetary union. To illustrate 
the euro’s benefits, Antonio de Lecea, a member 
of the EU delegation in Washington, said that if 
all 50 U.S. states maintained their own currencies, 
then conversion costs and exchange-rate volatility 
would severely constrain internal trade and invest-
ment in the U.S. While the effect of the euro on 
trade is difficult to isolate, de Lecea said that intra-
euro-area trade creation may range from 5 percent 
to 15 percent without apparent trade diversion 
from non-euro-area countries. Nonetheless, some 
of these benefits may not be shared equally, just as 
costs aren’t, given that some countries trade more 
intensely than others and their size and other 
characteristics differ.
Other potential advantages may come 
through the “internationalization” of the euro, a 
status envisioned by Marjolin in 1962, which may 
have been out of reach for any individual Europe-
an currency independently or as part of a credible 
fixed exchange rate regime.8 The international role 
of a currency emerges through increasing issuance 
of international debt securities, cross-border loans 
and cross-border deposits; encouraging foreign 
exchange trading; augmenting settlements and 
invoicing of international trade; and serving as of-
ficial reserve currency and anchor for other coun-
tries. As conference participants noted, the dollar 
still dominates along all of these dimensions, with 
the euro and yen distantly behind.
Georges Pineau, ECB representative in 
Washington and observer at the IMF, said the euro 
has emerged as the world’s second international 
reserve currency behind the dollar. Nonetheless, 
he was seconded by de Lecea in proclaiming that 
the position of the European institutions is neutral-
ity on the international role of the euro. Edwin 
Truman, senior fellow of the Peterson Institute 
and former head of the Federal Reserve’s Division 
of International Finance, noted that the global 
share of disclosed reserves denominated in euros 
rose to slightly less than 28 percent in 2009 from 
18 percent in 1999, at the expense of the yen and 
to a lesser degree of the dollar. He estimated that 
15 percent of total international dollar-denomi-
nated assets consist of foreign exchange reserves 
and argued that the same is probably true of the 
euro. Hence, in his view it would be a mistake to 
identify the international financial system with the 
international monetary system.
Euro-denominated international debt securi-
ties reached 32 percent in 2009 from 19 percent 
in 1999, while the proportion of all cross-border 
loans in euros lagged, though inching higher from 
12 percent in 1999 to 17 percent in 2009, Pineau 
said. The euro’s role as a trade invoicing or settle-
ment currency has grown somewhat from 18 
percent in 2001 to 29 percent in 2007, while the 
euro’s share in foreign exchange trading (by Con-
tinuous Linked Settlement System data) remained 
relatively steady between 2002 and mid-2008, 
Pineau added. The dollar’s position has declined 
somewhat by these measures since the introduc-
tion of the euro, but remains well ahead. The euro 
has only become dominant within its natural area 
Conference attendees at “The Euro and the Dollar in the Crisis and Beyond” conference held at the 
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of influence, those countries in close proximity 
and with deep trade ties to the euro area.
The euro enjoys special popularity among 
central and eastern European countries where it 
is widely used for invoicing of international trade 
and issuance of debt securities, both Darvas and 
Pineau said. In Asian markets, the dollar predomi-
nates as a reserve currency and for trade invoicing, 
leaving the euro with a relatively low profile, said 
Randall Henning, a visiting fellow at the Peter-
son Institute. The diminished use of the dollar 
among Latin American countries follows unex-
pected weak economic performance of dollarized 
countries and the collapse of Argentina’s currency 
board in 2002, Zarazaga said. The euro, however, 
has not benefited from this retreat, maintaining a 
marginal presence.
Concluding Remarks
Countries in a monetary union may, over 
time, turn their union into an optimal currency 
area, even if it wasn’t one before, through the 
benefits of a shared currency, as Jeffrey A. Frankel 
and Andrew K. Rose (1998) and Paul De Grauwe 
and Francesco Paolo Mongelli (2005) argued. On 
balance, conference participants agreed the euro’s 
first 10 years have proven a positive development, 
though the 2008–09 global recession refocused 
concerns about the euro’s role, its costs and, ulti-
mately, whether it constitutes an optimal currency 
area.
The recession also brought to the fore ques-
tions about the proper role of fiscal policy and 
the financial system in the context of a monetary 
union. Good policies and strong institutions and 
regulations matter, participants concluded. Posen 
of the Peterson Institute pointed to the debt crisis 
in the peripheral euro-area countries as evidence 
that common monetary policy is necessary 
but not sufficient to realize the full benefits of 
monetary union. Sound public finances are also 
required.
What became apparent with the spread of 
the crisis is that countries are now more intercon-
nected than before. Increasingly, nations have 
a vested interest in the quality of economic and 
financial policies elsewhere. Coordinated policy 
responses among industrialized countries send a 
strong signal of collaboration in addressing global 
economic challenges. The European experience 
also shows the limits of recourse to nonbinding 
policy coordination and other weakly enforceable 
commitments. Ten years into one of the most am-
bitious monetary undertakings in recent history, 
the same questions that punctuated the euro’s 
birth remain and will likely continue generating 
debate. It is a work in progress whose evolution we 
may well revisit a decade from now in Dallas.
—Enrique Martínez-García and Janet Koech
Papers, presentations and video from the con-
ference, "The Euro and the Dollar in the Crisis and 
Beyond," are available on the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas website, at www.dallasfed.org/institute/
events/10euro.cfm.
Notes
The authors thank Jason Saving and Mark Wynne for their 
comments. 
1The U.S.’s early commitment to redeem dollars for gold 
at the fixed rate of $35 per ounce contributed to the dol-
lar becoming the de facto anchor of the system and the 
predominant international reserve currency.
2 At the urging of the U.K., the European Free Trade Associ-
ation (EFTA), comprising most non-EEC countries in western 
Europe, was established in 1960. A free-trade agreement 
allows removal of trade barriers among members, while 
a customs union also requires uniform external tariffs—a 
common trade policy. Both are permitted regionally under 
Article XXIV of the GATT.
3 “Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Pro-
gramme of the Community for the Second Stage,” Chapter 
VIII (Monetary Policy), Brussels, Oct. 24, 1962.
4 The nominal exchange rate is the relative price of one 
currency in units of another. Hence, with “n” national 
currencies, there are always “n-1” exchange rates and the 
anchor currency to which they are pegged. In principle, 
a basket of currencies may also serve as anchor, though 
the lack of backing by a single monetary policy may be 
detrimental to its viability.Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2010 Annual Report • Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   17
5 The London Gold Pool was established in 1961 with 
reserves from the U.S. and seven other western European 
countries to defend in the London gold market the $35 per 
ounce dollar–gold parity established under Bretton Woods. 
After the Gold Pool’s collapse in 1968, a two-tier system of 
official and open market transactions was maintained until 
the U.S. unilaterally suspended direct convertibility of the 
dollar to gold in 1971.
6 The European Communities (ECSC, EEC and EAEC) shared 
the EEC executive and administrative bodies after the 
Merger Treaty of 1965 took effect in 1967. The EEC, re-
named European Community (EC), along with the ECSC and 
EAEC, became the first pillar of the European Union (EU) 
established in the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992. The 
ECSC expired in 2002, the EAEC remains a distinct entity, 
while the legal personality of the EC was subsumed into 
the EU with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. There have been 
successive enlargements to the European Communities/EU 
since the Hague Summit of 1969: 1973—Denmark, Ireland 
and the U.K.; 1981—Greece; 1986—Spain and Portugal; 
1990—East Germany (German unification); 1995—Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden; 2004—Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; 2007—Bulgaria and Romania.
7 Michael Woodford (1996) maintained that this is particu-
larly true if changes in the path of the government budget 
and debt have a discernible effect on aggregate demand 
(that is, if Ricardian equivalence fails).
8 Eleven European Union (EU) member states adopted 
the euro in 1999: Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal 
and Spain. Other EU countries have joined the euro since 
then: Greece (2001), Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), Malta 
(2008), Slovakia (2009) and Estonia (2011).
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Globalization increases integration of world 
economies through trade, financial ties, information 
exchange, technology and the movement of people. 
The rising importance of world trade and capital 
flows reflects enhanced economic and financial 
linkages. Nations with superior access to world 
markets can more fully exploit their competitive 
advantages, opening their economies to interna-
tional competition. With greater capital flows and 
freedom of capital movement, resources more 
effectively move to their most productive locations, 
contributing to rising living standards.
The African continent’s economies have 
increasingly opened themselves to world trade, at-
tracting foreign investment and adopting improved 
transportation and communication technologies. 
Still, growth has lagged behind other developing 
regions, and the continent remains relatively less 
integrated into the global economy. Africa’s nations, 
by strengthening macroeconomic policies and pur-
suing structural reforms, can take fuller advantage of 
globalization and reduce the risks of marginalization.
This article evaluates the current and future 
direction of globalization in Africa and explores how 
the continent can improve its growth prospects and 
meet the United Nations’ Millennium Development 
Goals by the 2015 target date.1 Behind the conti-
nent’s aggregate numbers reside its countries’ varied 
experiences. Regional or country data are applied 
wherever available to illustrate intra-Africa diver-
gence and to account for varying nation size. The 
continent’s experience over the past two decades 
suggests that globalization is a necessary, though 
not sufficient, condition for growth and develop-
ment.
African  Trade—Avenue to Globalization
Before the 2008–09 global recession, the 
continent experienced one of its longest and most 
geographically widespread growth spurts; real gross 
domestic product (GDP) expanded at an average 
annual rate of 5.5 percent from 2000 to 2007, and 
real GDP per capita, a measure of the standard 
of living, grew an average 3.1 percent during the 
period. The performance was partly supported by 
increased trade. Africa’s total merchandise trade 
(exports and imports combined) increased to more 
than $1.04 trillion in 2008 from $211 billion in 1990, 
before declining to $798 billion in 2009 amid the 
global slowdown. The continent’s share of world 
trade grew modestly to 3.2 percent in 2008 from 
2.7 percent in 1990, dipping slightly to 3 percent in 
2009. The uptick (before the worldwide economic 
slump) was mainly driven by demand from rapidly 
growing developing countries, such as China, Brazil 
and India, and by rising oil and commodity prices. 
Africa—Missing Globalization’s Rewards?
Chart 1
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However, the upsurge is confined to a handful 
of nations, and although total merchandise trade 
has increased across the continent, Africa’s overall 
contribution to world trade (3 percent in 2009 and 
3.2 percent in 2008) remains small and below that 
of other developing regions. By comparison, devel-
oping Asia accounted for 29 percent of global trade 
in 2009, up from 27 percent in 2008, while Latin 
America and the Caribbean contributed about 
6 percent in both 2009 and 2008.2 To gauge how 
much the regions trade relative to their economic 
sizes, it’s helpful to view each economy’s share of 
global GDP.  In 2009, developing Asia accounted 
for 19 percent of world GDP, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 7 percent, and Africa, 3 percent. With 
this comparison, Africa and Latin America trade 
with about the same level of intensity. 
Africa still depends on the developed econo-
mies for trade, but recent expansion has increas-
ingly involved exchanges with emerging countries. 
Such “South–South” cooperation is growing, and 
Africa has deepening linkages—through trade and 
financial flows—with economies such as China 
and India. Data before the slump indicate that total 
merchandise trade with other developing countries 
increased to $305 billion in 2008, from $21 billion in 
1990, while with developed countries it rose to $619 
billion, from $144 billion. Similarly, intra-African 
trade advanced to $115 billion in 2008, from $37 
billion in 1995. Other (non-African) developing 
countries’ share of Africa’s total trade reached 38.3 
percent in 2008, from 17.5 percent in 1990. 
The continent’s overall trade declined in 2009. 
Still, developed countries remain the region’s larg-
est trading partners even as their relative share of 
Africa's trade trended downward over the past 20 
years. The European Union, for example, is Africa’s 
main trade partner; however, its share diminished to 
less than 40 percent in 2008 from about 52 percent 
in the early 1990s (UNCTAD 2010) (Chart 1).
Developing Asia is increasingly important to 
the commercial dynamics of Africa. Its share of the 
continent’s trade has steadily increased, from an 
average 14 percent from 1995 to 2000 to 20 percent 
between 2000 and 2008 and 28 percent in 2009. 
Total trade between these two regions, in nominal 
terms, jumped nearly tenfold from 2000 to 2008. 
China has taken the lead among countries, moving 
to the top spot in 2009, as trade with advanced 
economies fell more relative to other developing 
nations. China (which trailed only the United States 
in total trade in 2008) has also become the region’s 
largest source of imports. Other countries, includ-
ing Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, also boosted 
ties with Africa and were among the continent’s top 
trading partners in 2008 and 2009 (Chart 2). 
Commodities dominate Africa’s foreign trade. 
Since 2002, primary exports increased significantly, 
Chart 2
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while manufactured goods rose by a lesser amount 
(Chart 3). In 2008, primary products accounted for 
82 percent of Africa’s exports, up from 70 percent in 
1995. Fuels make up a large proportion of primary 
commodity exports, amid new demand from China, 
India, Brazil and other rapidly growing economies. 
Among imports, manufactured products 
predominated, accounting for about 67 percent of 
the total amount from 1995 to 2008 (Chart 4). The 
significant increase in imports and exports after 
2002 coincides with China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization, which lowered trade barriers 
and improved market access and capital flows.
Even as the continent remained commodity-
dependent, it fell behind in exports of nonfuel 
primary commodities. The region also hasn’t 
diversified into more high-value-added products 
such as manufactured goods. Primary commodi-
ties’ production structures are poorly linked to the 
broader economy, generating fewer benefits than 
might otherwise be expected, according to a study 
by Sachs and Warner (1995). The continent’s poor 
economic performance, or missed opportunity over 
the past two decades, reflects in part an inability to 
move beyond dependence on primary commodi-
ties for export earnings.
Additionally, world prices for the commodities 
Africa sells tend to be more volatile and out of pro-
ducers’ control than those for manufactured items. 
Moreover, studies show that manufactured goods 
have fairly high income elasticities of demand and 
tend to offer better growth prospects (Lall 2000). 
Across the continent, structural factors such as poor 
infrastructure, a high cost of doing business, limited 
investment in human capital and educational at-
tainment, an unsettled political climate as well as 
an inability to take advantage of economies of scale 
are among constraints hindering development of a 
manufacturing sector and limiting growth. Thus, Af-
rica’s dependence on mostly unprocessed primary 
products has cost it the benefits it could have real-
ized if it had attained the same level of industrializa-
tion as other developing economies.
Chart 3
Fuels and Other Primary Commodities Dominate Africa's 
Exports
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Chart 4
Africa's Imports Depend on Manufactured Goods
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Financial Integration—Linking  Through 
Capital Flows
Africa’s trade increase was accompanied by a 
rise in foreign direct investment (FDI). Such inflows 
reached $72 billion in 2008, up from about $3 billion 
in 1990, before declining to $59 billion in 2009 amid 
recession-related commodity price declines (Chart 
5). A key component of FDI is reinvested earn-
ings; since FDI is mostly directed to the primary 
sector, which includes such activities as agriculture, 
forestry, mining, quarrying and oil extraction, falling 
commodity prices reduce profits and curtail FDI.
The significance of FDI to African economies—
as measured by the ratio of FDI to the region’s gross 
fixed capital formation—peaked at 27 percent in 
2006, slipping to 19 percent in 2009. Since 2000, 
FDI inflows have accounted for about 20 per-
cent of gross fixed capital formation. A decrease 
may affect the region’s investment prospects and 
impact much-needed infrastructure expenditures. 
The extent of the FDI drop in 2009 varied across 
subregions.3 East Africa declined 23 percent relative 
to 2008, while West Africa fell 10 percent. Flows to 
North Africa decreased by 24 percent, despite its 
more diversified FDI and sustained privatization 
programs that attracted foreign investment. The 
southern region, the continent’s largest recipient of 
FDI, fell 25 percent. FDI rose only in Central Africa, 
up 30 percent, mostly due to large investments in 
Equatorial Guinea.4 
Before the recent downturn, FDI surged to re-
cord highs. Developing countries’ investment in Af-
rica is among the factors behind this upward trend. 
These nations increasingly compete for investment 
opportunities with developed countries that tradi-
tionally provided the bulk of capital. Asian develop-
ing countries in particular account for the largest 
share of South–South FDI flows. China has become 
an important investor in the continent, although the 
bulk of its investments have been regionally focused 
(Chart 6). In 2008, 87 percent of total Chinese 
outlays to the region went to South Africa, mostly 
for acquisition of part ownership of Standard and 
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Chart 6
China's 2008 Investment 
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Chartered Bank by the government-owned Indus-
trial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). Other 
investments have gone into resource extraction, 
construction and manufacturing. Capital is drawn 
to securing natural resources, gaining direct access 
to local markets and capitalizing on the favorable 
investment climate in some areas. 
Other rapidly expanding economies—India, 
Malaysia, Turkey and Brazil—also increased in-
vestment in African natural resources. As a result, 
the region’s largest natural resource producers—
Angola, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa—consis-
tently are among top FDI recipients (Chart 7). 
African governments have become increas-
ingly committed to policies intended to attract 
stable FDI and boost capital inflows. The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s 
(UNCTAD) annual survey of changes to national 
laws and regulations shows that in 2006, 40 Afri-
can countries introduced 57 measures affecting 
FDI, 49 of them designed to encourage investment 
(World Investment Report 2007). They initiated 
measures allowing foreign investors easier access 
and tax reductions to promote capital inflows. 
For example, Kenya strengthened its investment 
promotion agency, while Nigeria cut the average 
property registration time to 80 days from 274. 
Ethiopia set up an advisory council for invest-
ment promotion, and Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania and 
Uganda were among nations establishing special 
investment zones.
Conversely, some governments adopted less-
favorable policies. Zambia introduced a tax regime 
in 2008 that boosted mining industry tax rates to 
47 percent from 31.7 percent. Algeria and Egypt 
also raised investment-related taxes.
FDI returned to regions where political stabil-
ity returned. Flows to Angola increased signifi-
cantly following the end of violent conflict. With 
rich petroleum and diamond endowments, Angola 
is a top FDI recipient, ranking first in the continent 
in both 2008 and 2009 (Chart 7).
Africa holds 10 percent of the world’s proven 
oil reserves, more than 80 percent of diamond 
holdings and a significant share of platinum and 
uranium stocks. South Africa alone has about 
40 percent of the world’s gold (UNCTAD 2009). 
Not surprisingly, most FDI has traditionally been 
concentrated in the primary sectors. However, the 
composition of FDI has changed in recent years. 
Collapsing commodity prices and diminished 
international financial resources during the reces-
sion cut funding directed toward primary goods. 
The service sector, led by the telecommunications 
industry, became the dominant FDI recipient. It 
attracted the largest share of cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions, with transactions such as 
Vodafone Group’s $2.4 billion purchase of VenFin 
Ltd. in April 2006 in South Africa and India’s Bharti 
Airtel acquisition of Kuwait’s Zain’s mobile phone 
networks in 15 African countries for $10.7 billion 
(World Investment Report 2010).
Even with recent investment, Africa’s FDI 
growth did not keep pace with other regions. While 
Chart 7
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African investment rose 30 percent from 2006 to 
2008, funding in Latin America and the Caribbean 
grew 94 percent (Chart 8A). Investment in all areas 
fell in 2009 amid the global slowdown. When ac-
counting for regional sizes by using FDI per capita, 
investment in West Asia and Latin America and 
the Caribbean significantly exceeded the rest of 
the developing economies (Chart 8B). Africa still 
receives the least investment of its peers.
To put the investment totals in perspective, 
Africa’s current share of global FDI remains lower 
than it was 40 years ago, when it peaked at 9.5 
percent in 1970 (Chart 9). It trended downward 
until 2000, when it reached a recent-term low. In 
2008, it stood at 4 percent, edging up to 5.3 percent 
in 2009, mainly because total FDI flows fell more 
worldwide than they did in Africa (a 37 percent 
drop globally compared with a 19 percent decline 
for Africa). Africa’s modest share and its mostly 
declining piece of global FDI and exports over the 
past two decades partly reflect slow progress in 
developing a diverse production base and in creat-
ing larger regional markets. FDI is important for 
development because, besides serving as a capital 
source, it stimulates employment and productivity, 
promotes the transfer of technology and enhances 
economic growth. Studies have found that coun-
tries that are open to trade will attract more FDI; 
thus, countries wishing to boost investment should 
also increase trade (Asiedu 2004).
Africa’s Development Lags
An International Monetary Fund state-
ment on globalization’s benefits cites “substantial 
evidence, from countries of different sizes and 
different regions, that as countries ‘globalize,’ 
their citizens benefit in the form of access to a 
wider variety of goods and services, lower prices, 
more and better-paying jobs, improved health 
and higher overall living standards” (IMF 2008).  
However, the trade and investment linkages in 
Africa have remained relatively unchanged since 
the 1990s even as globalization and economic 
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integration strengthened worldwide. Moreover, 
living standards have not noticeably progressed 
toward those of more advanced economies, nor 
has development accelerated. Per capita GDP—a 
rough estimate of average living standards—was 
little changed between 1990 and 2008, while other 
developing countries experienced significant 
improvement (Chart 10).
Over the past two decades, trade and FDI 
flows between Africa and the rest of the world 
have increased tenfold. However, among develop-
ing regions, these gains are relatively small, and 
more needs to be done to further integrate into 
the global economy and obtain globalization’s 
benefits.  
The neoclassical theory of growth suggests 
that initially laggard economies subsequently grow 
faster in per capita terms, catching up to those that 
started out ahead. According to the neoclassical 
model, poorer countries with lower capital-to-
labor ratios will grow more rapidly than richer 
countries with higher capital-to-labor ratios. Con-
vergence is expected because of a higher potential 
return on capital arising from capital scarcity and 
lower levels of capital per worker. That, in turn, 
accelerates capital accumulation and growth. Ad-
ditionally, poorer countries would be expected to 
grow faster than rich ones as technological know-
how flows from advanced nations to the laggards 
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995).
Such theory not only provides a framework to 
think about African development, but also supplies 
insight into how different countries have fared 
given similar initial economic and developmental 
endowments. Ghana and Malaysia were analyzed 
as proxies for the performance of African nations 
relative to non-African developing countries in a 
study that attempted to control for institutional 
factors and differences in initial conditions (Asare 
and Wong 2004). Both nations are former British 
Empire colonies and attained independence in 
1957. Each also began with a rich mix of resources, 
significant gold and foreign currency reserves, 
strong British legal and political institutions and 
similar educational systems. Malaysia had a per 
capita gross national product (GNP) of about $200 
while Ghana’s was $170 in 1958. The two countries 
have since followed very different paths. In 2000, 
Malaysia’s per capita GNP was $3,884—about 14 
times that of Ghana, at $285. Ghana has remained 
largely agricultural, with that sector accounting 
for about 36 percent of gross domestic output. 
Malaysia has become highly industrialized, with 
agriculture contributing only 14 percent to its 
gross domestic output.
Several factors may account for the countries’ 
divergence, including the extent to which they 
diversified their economies, their political environ-
ments and the level of investment and commit-
ment to develop human capital through education. 
While the neoclassical framework cannot explain 
this result, it helps provide reasons for the differ-
ences. Less-developed countries with low capital-
to-labor ratios should have higher marginal returns 
on capital and foreign investment. That Africa, as 
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a continent, has been unable to attract more FDI 
relative to other regions is symptomatic of deeper 
structural problems inhibiting the continent’s 
economies from fully recognizing investment op-
portunities. Policy incentives and structural factors 
may have prevented not only the realization of 
higher returns on capital, but also reallocation of 
resources to sectors such as manufacturing at the 
same speed as in other developing areas.
Many emerging countries have not caught 
up to the per capita income levels of developed 
nations. Some diverged over time, as in the case of 
Ghana and Malaysia. Nations that pursued poli-
cies to incentivize investment, including some in 
Asia and Latin America, have grown rapidly and 
are moving toward industrial countries’ standard 
of living. Moreover, nations that sought policies 
that facilitated (rather than impeded) realloca-
tion of resources toward manufacturing, as well as 
favoring structural reforms, benefited more from 
greater access to world markets and subsequently 
grew faster. Africa’s convergence process has 
mostly stalled except for isolated successes, such 
as Mauritius and Botswana. The divergence of 
Ghana and Malaysia, despite their similarity at the 
time of independence, lends support to the view 
that transparent and stable policies are needed for 
sustained economic success and global financial 
integration. Periods of political upheaval in Ghana 
during the past decade and its failure to diversify 
its economic structure and shift from mostly 
primary commodity exports to more value-added 
ones partly explain its performance. On the other 
hand, Malaysia is realizing benefits from globaliza-
tion because it avoided the problems that ham-
pered Ghana.
Globalization—A Necessary but 
Insufficient Condition for 
Development
Globalization creates new opportunities to 
access wider markets for trade, allocate capital 
inflows more effectively and improve the diffusion 
of technology. The developing world is becoming 
more integrated, though the pace varies across 
countries and regions. Globalization’s impact on 
growth and poverty reduction has been unbal-
anced, even marginal in some areas. Economic 
openness alone is insufficient to sustain growth. 
Countries seeking to take full advantage of global-
ization must install sound macroeconomic poli-
cies in addition to stable regulatory and incentive 
frameworks and good governance.
In Africa, obstacles to stronger globalization 
and growth include inadequate infrastructure, 
substandard governance and a lack of policies to 
enhance outward-oriented trade and capital flows. 
A stable macroeconomic environment—charac-
terized by low and predictable inflation, sustain-
able fiscal policies as well as relatively stable real 
exchange rates—is a prerequisite for high rates of 
investment and growth. Macroeconomic instabil-
ity increases uncertainty, discouraging financial 
commitment.
Conversely, boosting growth in developing 
countries is a necessary condition for attainment 
of the U.N.’s 2015 Millennium Development Goals. 
Chart 10
Africa's Real Per Capita GDP Ranks 
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These objectives include eradication of extreme 
poverty and hunger, achievement of universal 
primary school education, improvement of overall 
health conditions and establishment of global 
partnerships to foster development. According 
to the U.N., robust growth in the first half of the 
past decade reduced the number of people living 
on less than $1.25 a day in developing regions to 
1.4 billion in 2005 from 1.8 billion in 1990, while 
the poverty rate dropped to 27 percent from 46 
percent. However, with exports, commodity prices 
and investment all declining during the economic 
crisis, growth slowed, which complicated goal at-
tainment (U.N. 2010). To overcome the slowdown 
and to continue toward the targets, all regions, 
including Africa, must redouble efforts to ensure 
that they harness globalization’s benefits. 
Conclusion 
The growing share of developing countries' 
trade with Africa has reduced Africa's relative 
dealings with developed nations. However, the 
continent still trades most with the developed 
economies. Trade in the region is geographically 
concentrated and reinforces commodity depen-
dence, as primary products make up most exports, 
while manufactured goods are an increasingly 
large part of imports. This trade pattern—as well 
as weak infrastructure and inadequate policy 
reforms—has contributed to anemic economic 
performance. At current levels of trade, the conti-
nent remains far from achieving the growth rates 
deemed necessary to meet the U.N.’s development 
goals and improve the living standards for most of 
its population.
FDI remains concentrated in the primary 
sectors, although services have gained visibil-
ity. South–South capital flows have increased, 
with economies such as China, Brazil and India 
providing new investment. Some economies have 
opened to external trade and capital flows, but 
the continent remains in relative isolation com-
pared with most other developing and emerging 
economies. Africa’s performance over the past two 
decades indicates that despite globalization’s im-
portance for growth through increased trade and 
FDI, there must be more sound macroeconomic 
policies and structural reforms that promote 
investment, capital accumulation and economic 
integration to ensure sustainable growth. Without 
such measures, the continent can’t take full advan-
tage of greater economic openness.
—Janet Koech
Notes
1 The Millennium Development Goals are eight internation-
al benchmarks that United Nations member states agreed 
to achieve by 2015.
2 Economies classified by UNCTAD as “developing Asia” 
include four regions: West Asia, East Asia, South Asia and 
Southeast Asia. Individual groupings are as follows:
West Asia: Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, 
Palestinian Territory, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
East Asia: China, Hong Kong, Macao (China), Mongolia, 
North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan.
South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Timor-Leste, Vietnam.
3 African country groupings are as follows:
Southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.
East Africa: Comoros, Djibouti, Eretria, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Uganda, 
Tanzania.
Central Africa: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Repub-
lic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe.
West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Togo.
North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, 
Tunisia.
4 Commercial oil and gas reserves are the major attraction 
of FDI to Equatorial Guinea. The country also has substan-
tial deposits of minerals, including gold, diamonds, bauxite, 
iron ore, titanium, copper, manganese and uranium. The 
U.S. is the largest foreign investor in Equatorial Guinea.Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2010 Annual Report • Federal reserve Bank oF dallas   27
References
Asare, B., and A. Wong (2004), “An Economic Develop-
ment of Two Countries: Ghana and Malaysia,” West Africa 
Review, no. 5.
Asiedu, E. (2002), “On the Determinants of Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing Countries: Is Africa Different?,” 
World Development 30 (1): 107–19.
——— (2004), “Policy Reform and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment to Africa: Absolute Progress but Relative Decline,” 
Development Policy Review 22 (1): 41–48.
Barro, R.J., and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995), Economic Growth 
(New York: McGraw Hill).
Gu, Jing (2009), “China’s Private Enterprises in Africa 
and the Implications for African Development,” European 
Journal of Development Research 21 (4): 570–87.
IMF (2008), “Globalization: A Brief Overview,” Issues Brief, 
Issue 02/08 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund, May).
Lall, S. (2000), "The Technological Structure and Perfor-
mance of Developing Country Manufactured Exports: 
1985–1998," Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper no. 44 
(Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, June).
Sachs, J.D., and A.M. Warner (1995), “Economic Conver-
gence and Economic Policies,” NBER Working Paper no. 
5039 (Cambridge, Mass., National Bureau of Economic 
Research, February).
U.N. (2010), “The Millennium Development Goals Report” 
(New York: United Nations, June).
UNCTAD (2008), “Export Performance Following Trade 
Liberalization: Some Patterns and Policy Perspectives,” 
Economic Development in Africa 2008 (New York and 
Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, September).
——— (2009), “Strengthening Regional Economic Integra-
tion for Africa’s Development,” Economic Development in 
Africa Report 2009 (New York and Geneva: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, June).
——— (2010), “South–South Cooperation: Africa and 
the New Forms of Development Partnership,” Economic 
Development in Africa Report 2010 (New York and Geneva: 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
June).
Wang, Jian-Ye (2007), ”What Drives China’s Growing Role 
in Africa?,” IMF Working Paper no. 07/211 (Washington, 
D.C., International Monetary Fund, October).
World Investment Report (2007), “Transnational Corpora-
tions, Extractive Industries and Development,” World 
Investment Report 2007 (New York and Geneva: United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, October).
——— (2009), “Transnational Corporations, Agricultural 
Production and Development,” World Investment Report 
2009 (New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development, September).
——— (2010), “Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy,” 
World Investment Report 2010 (New York and Geneva: 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
July).
Yoshino, Y. (2008), “Africa–Asia Trade and Investment: Op-
portunities and Challenges” (World Bank, April).28   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas • Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2010 Annual Report
International trade is the centerpiece of the 
global economy; the United States increasingly 
turns to foreign suppliers for many consumer 
goods it once produced domestically. Yet, many 
studies of international trade emphasize only the 
starting and finish lines of the supply chain, with 
little consideration of how goods arrive at their 
final destination. A closer look at the logistics 
reveals a story of competition and innovation, in 
which a complex and dynamic network of ships 
moves the vast majority of traded goods across the 
world’s oceans. A number of indexes document 
two principal sectors of maritime shipping—dry 
bulk and container cargo—and are believed to 
foretell broader production and commercial devel-
opments. Understanding the methodology used 
in these measurements aids the understanding of 
international trade trends and their implication for 
recovery from the global financial crisis.
Dry Bulk Market
Baltic Dry Index: An Industry Standard
The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) measures shipping 
costs for dry bulk commodities, including coal, 
grain, iron ore, finished steel and other metals, 
minerals and similar materials. Representatives of 
the Baltic Exchange, the ship brokers’ association 
responsible for publishing the index, canvass a 
panel of members daily and gather charter rates 
(in U.S. dollars) for representative cargoes and 
routes. In a “time charter” system, agents seeking 
to transport cargo typically work through brokers, 
who hire a ship at a per diem rate. The charter is 
active from the moment the ship’s owner delivers 
a vessel for voyage until it is returned free of cargo. 
Charters may be thought of as a type of forward 
agreement: Both brokers and their clients gain the 
security of set income and availability at the risk 
of losing out on favorable future price movements. 
Additionally, the Baltic International Freight Fu-
tures Exchange uses the BDI as a settlement index, 
providing sellers and buyers a baseline for futures 
contracts used to hedge charter rates. 
The BDI began in 1985 as the Baltic Freight 
Index, based on a weighted average of shipping 
costs on 13 trade routes: grain (five routes), coal 
(three routes), iron ore (one route) and gen-
eral charter (four routes).1 The Baltic Exchange 
reserves the right to modify these routes or their 
weightings, and since 1985, the number of routes 
included in the index has increased to match trade 
volumes. In October 2001, the BDI underwent 
major expansion to cover 26 shipping routes and 
four vessel sizes: Handysize, Supramax, Panamax 
and Capesize.2 Their names refer to limits on their 
ability to transit the Panama Canal: Handysize and 
Supramax ships have no restrictions due to size, 
Panamax are at the limit for passage and Capesize 
are too large for the canal and must travel around 
the Cape of Good Hope off South Africa or Cape 
Horn at the tip of South America. These carriers 
typically transport cargo in lots exceeding 10,000 
dead-weight tons (DWT); most often, a single 
client books an entire vessel for one cargo type. 
These size classes comprise 36 percent of the mer-
chant and nonmerchant global fleet of ships.3
The Baltic Exchange employs a methodology 
that preserves the continuity of the BDI through 
vessel and route modifications by calculating a 
time-charter average (TCA), a standard metric 
used in the shipping industry to assess the daily 
average revenue performance of a given vessel. 
Expressed in U.S. dollars per voyage day, the TCA 
is computed by subtracting expenses such as port 
costs from voyage revenue and dividing the ad-
justed number by the number of voyage days. The 
TCA for an entire vessel class is found by taking 
the average of all individual TCAs. The composite 
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BDI is the product of an unweighted average of 
TCAs for all vessel classes and a “continuity multi-
plier,” which changes when routes or vessel classes 
are added to or removed from the index. The BDI 
calculation is
BDI = (CapesizeTCA + PanamaxTCA + 
SupramaxTCA + HandysizeTCA)/
4 * 0.113473601
As an index for the dry bulk shipping industry, 
the BDI’s advantages are its rich historical data, 
large underlying membership and daily frequency 
of time charter rates. The index has gained a repu-
tation as a bellwether of economic activity and is 
used to forecast industrial production and eco-
nomic growth. Unlike forward rate agreements, the 
index lacks a speculative component; in theory, it 
operates according to the fundamentals of supply 
and demand for ship capacity in real time. An in-
dex that trends upward means shipping prices are 
being bid up. This should signal rising demand for 
shipping space and accelerating economic activity. 
However, critics downplay the BDI’s predic-
tive power. China’s rapid industrialization, they say, 
has shifted the index to reflect Chinese demand 
for commodities. They also point to commodity 
futures markets as providing better metrics for 
predicting future demand and to overcapacity that 
plagues both dry bulk and container fleets. In nor-
mal circumstances, the critics say, the index may 
hint at the direction of activity, but the financial 
crisis has revealed instability in the measure that 
makes it unsuitable as a predictive tool.
Supply Sensitivity Causes Volatility in BDI
A closer look into the methodology of the BDI 
reveals that index values may change even if under-
lying demand for capacity does not. Since the BDI 
approximates the prevailing rate for cargo space, 
the index may drop if excess space—added capacity 
for which no demand exists—comes online. This 
pattern occurs frequently in the shipbuilding cycle, 
as shipbuilders respond to high demand by ramp-
ing up construction of vessels, which require two to 
three years to complete. By then, demand may have 
diminished and these deliveries may not be needed. 
Additionally, shipyards do not adjust output quickly 
and will offer low vessel prices in a depressed mar-
ket to unload excess inventory. This combination 
of delayed supply and prolonged periods of excess 
capacity causes shipbuilding cycles to last longer 
than broader business cycles. The BDI becomes es-
pecially volatile when supply and demand for ship-
ping capacity change simultaneously, as occurred 
during the recent shipping bust (Chart 1). 
After a 2005–07 shipping boom, the BDI 
dropped 94 percent from May to December 2008 
during the throes of the global financial crisis. In 
June 2010, the index averaged 2,375, a fourfold 
increase from the December 2008 trough, but still 
more than 2,000 points off the three-year average. 
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From last May 25 to July 16, the index dropped 
from more than 4,000 points to just above 1,700, an 
almost 58 percent decline. After rallying in the fall, 
the index fell again to close out 2010 below 1,800. 
Also, dry bulk goods are used principally to 
produce other goods, and demand is dependent 
on when finished goods come to market. Rice and 
grain can arrive in consumer markets quickly, while 
iron ore manufactured into steel requires more time. 
Thus, even if raw goods shipments are expanding, 
when the supply chain will move these items into 
their finished stage isn’t clear. Economic surprises, 
unanticipated pricing changes, tariffs and quotas 
can disrupt the supply chain and delay manufac-
turing, complicating the BDI’s ability to predict the 
direction and pace of global economic activity.
The Container Ship Market
A ship carrying dry bulk cargo usually trans-
ports a single type of load, such as iron ore, coal or 
grain. Container ships, by comparison, typically 
carry a wide variety of finished goods from a mul-
titude of sellers. Before the standardized shipping 
container gained popularity in the 1950s, moving 
such cargoes was inefficient and even dangerous.4 
An International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO)-approved standard container measures 
20 x 8 x 8.5 (twenty-foot equivalent unit, TEU) or 
40 x 8 x 8.5 (forty-foot equivalent unit, FEU) and 
provides ship owners with homogeneous cargo, 
mechanized loading and discharging systems, and 
streamlined transport across ship, truck and rail.5 
As of August 2010, 4,914 container ships with 
a carrying capacity of 178 million DWT sailed 
in the world fleet, compared with 7,748 dry bulk 
carriers with a capacity of 500 million DWT. From 
1990 to 2006, the worldwide container ship fleet 
grew 9.2 percent, while the dry bulk fleet expanded 
more slowly, 3.2 percent.6 However, since 2009, the 
dry bulk fleet has grown significantly faster than 
the container ship fleet (Chart 2). 
While the dry bulk market has its de facto 
standard measure of costs, no single standard 
serves such a role for container shipping. Instead, 
ship brokers’ associations assemble indexes based 
on data from member fleets. Container ship 
indexes measure either container ship spot rates 
or time-charter rates. Spot rate indexes record 
the current cash price of transporting an ISO-
approved container across a designated route for 
immediate payment and delivery and serve as a 
sector snapshot of the container ship market. For 
example, Drewry Shipping Consultants releases a 
container ship spot-rate index that tracks the cost 
of transporting an FEU container between Hong 
Kong and Los Angeles. By comparison, time-char-
ter data for container ships are calculated the same 
way as for dry bulk shipping and are provided in 
earnings per voyage day. 
The container ship market reached record 
lows in port traffic, spot prices and time-charter 
rates during the global financial crisis. A disparity 
between cash and charter rates grew as liner com-
panies, coping with low import volumes, reduced 
capacity by returning vessels as soon as charters 
Chart 2
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expired. Sellers also managed risk by signing short-
er charter contracts, further depressing prices. 
Container fleet capacity grew 6 percent in 
2009, while demand fell 11 percent. In 2010, even 
with slow steaming—a tactic by liners to reduce 
the speed of ships in their fleet, keeping ships full 
of cargo longer—and scrapping, which analysts 
estimate effectively reduced capacity growth to 
1 percent of current fleet size, supply exceeded 
demand by 12 percent.7 Meanwhile, 36 percent 
of scheduled deliveries never materialized due to 
cancellation or postponement. Accordingly, orders 
for new container ships fell 26 percent, with 94,720 
TEU contracted for in 2009, representing less than 
2 percent of ships already on order. Meanwhile, 
liners scrapped 340,000 TEU in 2009, a record 
high, though most retired vessels were small. 
Disproportionate growth in large, Capesize class 
container ships offset the impact of scrapping.
In 2010, 2.1 million TEU were scheduled to 
enter the container fleet, including 1.4 million in 
the Capesize class. However, analysts at Danish 
Ship Finance, a Copenhagen-based financing firm, 
estimate that liners deferred 760,000 TEU until 
2011 and undertook more extensive scrapping 
(an estimated 390,000 TEU) and slow steaming to 
compensate for the rapid capacity expansion.
Harper Petersen Index (HARPEX)
HARPEX is a container ship charter rate index 
released by Harper Petersen and Co., a ship broker 
based in London and Hamburg. Like the Baltic Ex-
change, Harper Petersen collects information from 
its members. Instead of using shipping routes as 
a unit of analysis, HARPEX weights average daily 
charter rates across eight size classes of vessels to 
formulate its index. 
Harper Petersen calculates an average vessel 
rate based on the number of charter parties using a 
given ship and defines eight ship classes by storage 
capacity, speed and charter length (the duration 
that clients contract to use ship space). This average 
takes into account a base rate for each class of ves-
sel, defined as the sum of the cost of capital invested 
in the ship, which depreciates over time, and 
operating costs. Then, an index for each vessel class 
is compiled based on how the average vessel rate 
compares with its base rate. Individual indexes are 
weighted by class and averaged to form the com-
posite HARPEX index, reported weekly (Chart 3). 
Clarkson’s ClarkSea Time Charter Index
Clarkson’s, a ship broker based in London, 
publishes weekly time-charter average earnings 
for all vessels in the container market, making it 
the most broad-based such measure of shipping 
rates (Chart 4). According to Clarkson’s, its gauge, 
the ClarkSea Time Charter Index, is the only pub-
lished weekly indicator of earnings for all principal 
commercial vessel types. Figures are estimated as 
daily time-charter equivalents of voyage freight 
rates and are expressed in U.S. dollars/day per voy-
age. Unlike the HARPEX index, which uses freight 
rates dependent upon its eight vessel classes, 
Clarkson’s calculates earnings based on a single 
freight rate and publishes rates for only the newest 
vessels. These methodological differences have not 
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data track each other with high correlation, a com-
parison of the two shows.
Hamburg Shipbrokers’ Association 
New Contex Index
The Hamburg Shipbrokers’ Association 
(VHSS) New Contex Index reports time-charter 
data from member brokers in Hamburg, Copen-
hagen, London and Paris (Chart 5). The index’s 
strength is its breadth: More than 50 percent of the 
worldwide container fleet operates from Germany, 
and Hamburg brokers control 75 percent of all 
container charter tonnage, according to the VHSS. 
However, the dataset is not as comprehensive as 
Clarkson’s since VHSS surveys only its members. 
The composite index is an analysis of container 
ship time-charter rates based on 20 to 30 Hamburg 
freight brokers across 10 size categories and a 
minimum charter period of three months. In this 
sense, the New Contex Index provides more gran-
ular data than Clarkson’s index, which is a com-
posite earnings benchmark. Since its creation in 
October 2007, the New Contex Index has tracked 
closely with Clarkson’s, though its relatively short 
history limits its usefulness.
Producer Price Indexes
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) com-
piles producer price indexes and reports relative 
price changes for water and deep-sea freight trans-
port (Chart 6).  The water transport index includes 
inland shipping, while the deep-sea freight index 
focuses on open-water transport. The BLS sys-
tematically selects for polling U.S. manufacturers 
within an industry that seek unemployment insur-
ance (as classified by the North American Industry 
Classification System). Because the probability of 
a firm’s selection increases as its employee count 
rises, the survey appears weighted toward larger 
firms. Using disaggregation, a statistical technique 
in which the firms’ goods are categorized accord-
ing to how much they contribute to overall rev-
enue, the BLS determines products and services to 
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be included in its survey. Disaggregation is carried 
out until specific products sold to specific buyers 
are identified and tracked over time.
Producer price index participants report for 
seven years, and the survey sample for each indus-
try grouping is much larger than any other shipping 
trade index. These characteristics translate into low 
implied index volatility. However, the reliability 
that the index’s large sample size achieves comes 
with a loss of precision. The BLS collects price 
data from all U.S.-based firms within the deep-sea 
freight industry, not just charter rates for container 
and dry bulk shipping. Participants are guaranteed 
confidentiality, so observers cannot know what 
proportion of the price index is composed of infor-
mation from tonnage providers, dock operators, 
ship liners or other water transport entities. Finally, 
the BLS’s reliance on U.S. firms excludes the large 
industry segment based outside the country.
Table 1 shows pair-wise correlation statistics 
between dry bulk and container indexes and 
prices for bunker fuel, a key variable ship cost. 
The HARPEX and BDI do not move in step, with a 
correlation coefficient equal to 0.16 from 1995 to 
2010. (A coefficient of “1” would theoretically in-
dicate complete agreement between the indexes.) 
What causes the disparity? Demand for commodi-
ties and finished goods do not move contempora-
neously, but should peak and trough in a cyclical 
fashion: Finished goods are particularly sought 
during economic booms, while demand for raw 
goods generally lags behind and lasts longer as 
sellers replenish inventories depleted during 
periods of sustained demand. A year-over-year 
comparison, offering a more general view of index 
movements, provides a closer relation between the 
BDI and HARPEX, with a correlation coefficient 
of 0.7. Worth noting is the difference in volatility 
present in the BDI for 1995–2001 compared with 
2001–10, which suggests that an adjustment in 
index methodology may have played a role in how 
the BDI compares with other shipping indexes. 
The BDI and the producer price index simi-
Chart 6
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larly lack correlation, with a coefficient of 0.08 be-
fore 2001 and –0.03 afterward. The producer price 
index draws on data only from companies seeking 
unemployment insurance in the United States; by 
comparison, only one of the BDI ship brokers’ data 
providers is a U.S. firm (John F. Dillon and Co.). 
While both indexes measure aggregate prices for 
maritime shipping, they share little methodologi-
cal common ground. Indexes for the container 
shipping industry, on the other hand, track each 
other to a high degree. HARPEX and Clarkson’s 
have the highest correlation in the analysis, 0.76, 
over the entire sample range. 
Shipping Indexes and Energy Prices
Even with maritime transport’s economies 
of scale, moving thousands of tons of cargo still 
requires significant maintenance and fuel expense. 
The cost of bunker fuel, as an input to produc-
tion, affects time-charter and spot rates and likely 
influences dry bulk and container ship indexes. As 
anticipated, the correlation coefficient between 34   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas • Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2010 Annual Report
No. 6 crude oil (bunker fuel) and the BDI is higher 
than the correlation with any other index, 0.35 for 
1986–2010. Following the index revision in 2001, 
the BDI began to track more closely with bunker 
fuel prices, 0.4. 
Oil prices, however, appear to factor less into 
container shipping market indexes. The correla-
tion coefficient between the HARPEX index and 
bunker spot prices is 0.2 for 1995–2010; between 
Clarkson’s index and bunker oil, 0.26. One reason 
for the disparity: Materials classified as “dry bulk” 
are denser than container cargo, meaning that for 
a given volume and distance, dry bulk cargoes are 
heavier and more energy-intensive.
Conclusion
Maritime shipping markets for bulk and 
container cargo have rebounded since the global 
financial crisis, but industry indexes have not 
converged to signal a future path. While container 
shipping seems to have recovered, reflecting 
global trade volumes, dry bulk commodities, 
as measured by the BDI, have faltered and still 
exhibit high volatility. Dry bulk shippers continue 
to confront excess capacity in an uneven demand 
environment. Fleets expanded rapidly during the 
2005–07 shipping boom in both container ship 
and dry bulk sectors, especially in the larger ship 
classes. Heightened demand spurred investment 
to increase vessel capacities and encouraged in-
tense investment in shipbuilding. As a result, Chi-
na solidified its presence as a top-tier shipbuilding 
nation, while orders for new vessels and earnings 
reached record highs. The global financial crisis hit 
shipping especially hard, as sellers kept inventories 
low amid a scarcity of credit. Weak final demand 
created significant capacity surpluses, following 
the boom-period fleet additions. With emergence 
of a new pace of trade, vessel scrapping intensified 
amid sluggish growth in advanced markets. 
By examining the methodology used to create 
the sector’s indexes, we understand how reliably 
Table 1
Comparison of Shipping Rates
(Pair-wise correlation table of shipping indexes and fuel cost*)
January 1995–september 2001
Baltic dry Clarkson’s HarPeX Producer price 
index
Bunker fuel standard 
deviation
Baltic dry 1 0.28 0.20 0.08 0.21 0.08
Clarkson’s 0.28 1 0.61 0.07 0.17 0.07
HarPeX 0.20 0.61 1 0.15 0.21 0.06
Producer price 
index
0.08 0.07 0.15 1 0.16 0.02
Bunker fuel 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.16 1 0.10
october 2001–november 2010
  Baltic dry Clarkson’s HarPeX Producer price 
index
Bunker fuel standard 
deviation
Baltic dry 1 0.20 0.15 –0.03 0.40 0.21
Clarkson’s 0.20 1 0.83 0.24 0.28 0.07
HarPeX 0.15 0.83 1 0.36 0.18 0.06
Producer price 
index
–0.03 0.24 0.36 1 0.10 0.02
Bunker fuel 0.40 0.28 0.18 0.10 1 0.10
*Due to its brief history, the Hamburg Index is not included in the correlation analysis.
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they capture the state of global markets as well as 
the potential for predicting future economic activ-
ity. Shipping indexes can measure time-charter 
rates, spot rates or aggregate prices, and all rely on 
survey data gathered from or estimated by panel-
ists, participants or members of ship brokering 
associations. Evaluation of these indexes suggests 
that dry bulk shipments tend to face mismatches 
in the timing of supply and demand because of 
the relatively long lifespan of the bulk cargo fleet, 
while container ships are more versatile, carry 
cargo from many sellers and are generally smaller. 
Although the BDI remains the industry standard 
for dry bulk shipping, the container shipping 
industry has multiple indexes that generally track 
one another closely. However, differing sample 
sizes as well as methods of indexing, data collec-
tion and aggregation introduce relative strengths 
and weaknesses for each measure (Table 2). Such 
differences may yield index values that are biased 
or do not reflect the totality of global shipping ac-
tivity and illustrate the importance of a careful and 
holistic evaluation of all evidence when offering 
analysis or predicting future trends.
—Payton Odom
Notes
1 Martin Stopford’s Maritime Economics text contains a 
comprehensive discussion of the Baltic Dry Index and is 
cited throughout this article. See Maritime Economics, by 
Martin Stopford, London: Routledge, 2009.
2 Information on the composition and calculation of the 
Baltic Dry Index comes from the Baltic Exchange’s Manual 
for Panelists: A Guide to Freight Reporting and Index 
Production, www.balticexchange.com.
3 “Review of Maritime Transport 2010,” United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, New York and 
Geneva, 2010.
4 See The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the 
World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger, by Marc 
Levinson, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
5 See note 1, Stopford, p. 574.
6 See note 1, Stopford, p. 370. 
7 “Shipping Market Review,” Danish Ship Finance, Copen-
hagen, April 2010.
Table 2 
Summary of Shipping Indexes
Index Type Method advantages disadvantages
Baltic dry Dry bulk Time-charter equivalent 
earnings average across four 
size classes
Historical data, large mem-
bership listing, industry 
standard status
Subject to overstated volatility due 
to fixed supply, changes in meth-
odology affect volatility of index, 
simple average calculation ignores 





earnings across four size 
classes
Measures and weights 
eight size classes of 
container ship, includes 
vessel prices for previous 
four years
Near-perfect correlation with 




Weighted average of all 
container ship earnings
Most comprehensive 
and longest spanning of 
container series
Earnings based on a single freight 
rate and only most-modern vessels 





weighted across 10 size 
classes
Only company-independent 
analysis of time-charter 
rates








Price data from a sample of 
firms' products and services 
over time
Large sample size, low 
index volatility, only 
capture of aggregate 
price level that is not an 
average across different 
size classes
Only captures data from U.S. ship-
ping companies, weighted toward 
larger firms, does not distinguish 
between charter rates and 
other services involved in water 
transport, does not distinguish 
between liners and bulk shippers 
nor between cargo types36   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas • Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute 2010 Annual Report
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Conference on Microeconomic Sources of 
Real Exchange Rate Behavior
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and 
Vanderbilt University’s Center for International 
Price Research cosponsored a conference titled 
"Microeconomic Sources of Real Exchange Rate 
Behavior," held at Vanderbilt University in Nash-
ville, Tenn., on Sept. 23–25, 2010.
The following papers are available on the 
Dallas Fed website at www.dallasfed.org/institute/
events/2010/10micro.cfm. Names with an asterisk 
(*) are those of coauthors who presented at the 
conference.
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